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Abstract
The theory of auction design examines how various factors affect
the outcome of an auction. Most of the existing literature focuses on
how varying the amount of information available to each bidder affects
the bid-taker's expected revenue when all other factors remain con-
stant. This paper studies how the bid-taker's expected revenue varies
with changes in the auction format when such changes affect the number
of bidders. Specifically, we examine how varying the reservation
price or screening level affects the bid-taker's expected revenue
though its effect on the number of bidders. For two simple examples,
the losses associated with a reduced number of bidders outweighs any
benefits that non-trivial reservation prices might have had in models
with an exogonously set number of bidders.
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Introduction
The bid-taker's expected revenue from an auction depends on how
the bidders will bid, which in turn, depends on a variety of factors.
The auction rules announced by the bid-taker — rules specifying how
the bidding will be conducted, and how the bidding will determine who
wins what and who pays whom how much — typically affect the bidding.
The number of bidders, and the type and amount of information held by
each bidder about the underlying true state of nature may also affect
the bidding. In addition, the bidders' utilities for different
auction outcomes as a function of the true state, and the distribution
of the true state itself often affects the bidding.
The theory of auction design attempts to understand, describe, and
predict how the bid-taker's expected revenue depends on the factors
that affect the bidding. To do so, the theory must also model — or
make appropriate assumptions about — how the bids made — or certain
aggregated characteristics or consequences of the bids made — depend
on what the bidders know about the auction rules, the true state of
nature, and their own preferences. Here the theory draws on concepts
ranging from dominant strategies to a variety of different types of
equilibria. As a result, the predicted expected revenue varies not
only with the factors that affect how bidders bid, but also with the
assumptions on how these factors affect the bidding.
The early literature on auction design mainly compares the expected
outcome in one specific auction with that in another specific auction.
For example, Vickrey (1961) considers a model of auctions in which
each bidder knows his own value for the single object being sold, and
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that other bidders' values and information are independent of, and
identically distributed with, his own. He examines the Nash
equilibria of the first price and the second price sealed bid versions
of this independent private values model , and discovers that at
equilibrium, both auctions yield the same expected revenue to the
bid-taker. More recently, Milgrora and Weber (1982) formulated a much
more general model of auctions of a single object to risk neutral
bidders, and among other results, compare the expected revenue of the
bid-taker at the corresponding Nash equilibrium for three specific
types of auctions. Roughly speaking, the more (affiliated) informa-
tion each bidder has, the higher the bid-taker's expected revenue.
The later literature on auction design tends to suppress the
details of the auction rules and of how the various factors affect how
bidders bid. Instead, it simply places restrictions directly on how
the outcome of the auction may depend on the bidders' information,
number, and preferences. These restrictions implicitly define fami-
lies of auctions; the literature examines how the outcome — sometimes
focusing exclusively on the bid-taker's expected revenue — depends on
the various factors that might affect the outcome. For example,
Myerson (1981) considers all mechanisms satisfying two conditions
within the independent private values model. Roughly speaking, one
condition requires that each bidder have an alternative in effect
identical to withdrawing from the auction entirely, while the other
condition requires that no bidder have an incentive to lie to himself
about the information that only he observes. As a result, the bid-
taker's expected revenue depends only on how the final award of the
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object relates to the bidders' values. In particular, any mechanism
satisfying Myerson's conditions (in an independent private values
model) that always awards the object to the bidder valuing it most
highly will generate the same expected revenue for the bid-taker — a
generalization of Vickrey's result.
In addition, Myerson examines how the bid-taker's expected revenue
varies with the allocation rule. In particular, he discovers that to
maximize the bid-taker's expected revenue, the object should be
awarded to the bidder who values it most highly if and only if this
highest value exceeds some critically chosen reservation or screening
level; otherwise, the bid-taker keeps the object. This optimal allo-
cation rule gives a positive probability that the bid-taker retains
the object even though some bidder has offered to pay more than the
bid-taker's value for the object.
Then why do real world auctions advertise "all items will be sold
without reserve?" Why do many states outlaw shills — agents of the
bid-taker who bid like other bidders and have the same effect as an
unknown reservation price? Are these practices misguided, or do the
traditional models of auctions and competitive bidding miss some-
thing?
Up to now, the auction design literature focused on models that
exogonously specify the number of bidders and what private information
each bidder observes, and studies the affect on the bid-taker's ex-
pected revenue of varying amounts of this (and any private information
of the bid-taker) being revealed to everyone. In contrast, we shall
study how the bid-taker's expected revenue varies with the auction
format when such changes affect the number of bidders or the amount of
private information acquired by each. Specifically, we will examine
the affect of the screening level on the bid-taker's expected revenue
when the screening level itself affects the number of bidders (pos-
sibly through its affect on the bidders' expected profits). In at
least some cases, the loss of bidders from using a non-trivial
reservation price hurts the bid-taker's expected revenue more than the
non-trivial reservation price's beneficial effect on the expected
revenue from a fixed number of bidders.
An Example
:
This section presents an example illustrating the types of ques-
tions that might be asked, the methods that might be used, and the new
insights that might be gained studying models of auctions in which the
number of bidders, or the amount of information acquired by the bid-
ders, might vary with the auction rules. In particular, we will vary
the reservation price — or more accurately, the screening level — in
a specific independent private values model in which the number of
bidders might decrease as the screening level increases. The maximum
possible expected revenue for the bid-taker results from increasing
the screening level from zero until either the number of bidders
drops, or until the optimal screening level for a fixed number of
bidders model is reached — whichever happens first. In general, this
screening level will be less than that derived by Myerson for models
with a fixed number of bidders.
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Specif ically , consider the following independent private values
model: each of the n risk neutral hidders knows his own value v for
the object being sold and that the bidders' values are independent
draws from the known cumulative probability distribution F(v). (For
the moment, think of n as a fixed, positive integer.) The object
will be awarded to the bidder who values it most highly, so long as
this value exceeds the known screening level r; otherwise, the bid-
taker destroys the object. (Without any loss of generality, restrict
r to lie in the support of F. ) Then, by performing the calculations
in the context of a second price sealed bid auction, but appealing to
the equivalence results of Myerson or of Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1985a, b;
1986) for auctions with independent information, the bid-taker has an
expected revenue R(rn,) of nr(l-F(r) )(F(r) ) +
n(n-l) f v(l-F(v))(f (v))
n dF(v). Note that if the appropriate
v>r
derivatives exist and if the r that maximizes R(r,n) lies strictly
within the support of F, then the optimal r must satisfy the first
order condition — R(r,n) = 0; this condition reduces to l-F(r) = rf(r),dr
where f(v) denotes the probability density function -r— F(v).
dv
For our example, we assume the bidders' values to be uniformly
distributed on the unit interval. This yields an expected bid-taker
_ n-1 n 2n n+1 „ , . , . , _,. . .
revenue of -rr + r ^= r . Note that for this example, 1) R(r,n)
has a unique maximum with respect to r at r equals one half, 2) R(r,n)
is strictly increasing with respect to n, and 3) R(0,n+1) - R(l/2,n)
has a (unique) minimum with respect to n at n equals :
—
r^r\— (which
ln(2)
is less than unity), and has a strictly positive minimum value.
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Now, assume that n will not increase, and may decrease, as r
increases. Then, in our example, for r greater than one-half, the
bid-taker's expected revenue would be increased by reducing r to
one-half, both because this would maximize the expected revenue if the
number of bidders remained fixed, and because, in addition, the number
of bidders may increase, thereby further increasing the bid-taker's
expected revenue. Therefore, the optimal r will be at most one-half.
However, for any r less than or equal to one-half, R(r ,n+l) exceeds
R(0,n+1) (by the fact that R has a unique maximum at r equal to
one-half, and must therefore be an increasing function of r for r less
than one-half). But now, the third fact noted above implies that
R(0,n+1) exceeds R(l/2,n). Finally, R having a unique maximum at r
equal to one-half implies that R(l/2,n) exceeds R(r ,n) for any r .
Taken together, we have that for any r less than or equal to one-
half, and any r at all, and any n, R(r ,n+l) exceeds R(r
9
,n).
Therefore, a screening level of r maximizes the bid-taker's expected
revenue only if it is less than or equal to one-half and if it results
in the largest possible number of bidders that would bid under any
value of r; if more than one value of r satisfies these necessary
conditions, then the monotonicity of R in r for r less than one-half
implies that the optimal r will be the largest r satisfying the
necessary conditions.
Note that for a fixed number of bidders in our example, the
bidders' expected profit decreases as the screening level increases
from zero to one-half and as the number of bidders increases. There-
fore, if an individual demands at least some minimal, but strictly
-7-
positive, expected profit — perhaps to simply cover the costs of
obtaining the private information or of preparing a bid — then the
number of individuals willing to bid will decrease as the screening
level increases from zero to one-half. Thus, the optimal screening
level in this example will typically be less than one-half — the
optimal screening level in this model for any fixed number of bidders.
In this example, the number of bidders only changes in discrete
steps; this lets us avoid having to model explicitly how changing the
reservation price affects the number of bidders. As a result, a
non-trivial reservation will still be optimal so long as the number of
bidders bidding is the maximum possible (in other words, the number
that would bid if the reservation price were zero). However the
example does suggest the possibility that in models where the (ex-
pected) number of bidders, or the amount of information each acquires,
may vary continuously with the reservation price, no non-trivial
reservation price will ever be optimal. The following section pre-
sents an example illustrating this possibility.
Another Example:
This example illustrates the possible effects of a non-trivial
reservation price on the bid-taker's expected revenue when the ex-
pected number of bidders varies continuously with the screening level
r. To motivate the example, think, of a market with many potential
bidders, each of which participates in any specific auction with some
probability, and that the probability of bidding will be chosen to
vary with r so that on average the bidders actually bidding just
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recover some fixed minimal costs. Specifically, modify the previous
section's example so that the number of bidders bidding in any spe-
cific auction may be viewed as the outcome of a Poisson distributed
random variable, a random variable whose outcome is independent of the
bidders' values for the object, but whose mean X varies with r so that
the bidders' total expected profit divided by the mean number of bid-
ders — in a sense, the expected profit per bidder — remains con-
stant.
Again, performing the calculations in terms of a second price
sealed bid auction and again appealing to the known equivalence re-
sults for auctions with independent values, for fixed n and r the
expected bid-taker revenue R(r,n) will be as before, while the winning
bidder's expected value for the object V(r,n) will be
n ( v (F(v)) dF(v). Now, by using a probability e X /n! of n bid-
v>r
ders bidding, and averaging over all possible numbers of bidders, we
get that for any fixed r and X, the bid-taker's expected revenue
K*(r,X) equals Xr(l-F(r))eUF(r)
"1)
+ X
2
f v(l-F(v) )e
X(F(v)_1)
dF(v)
v>r
and the winner's expected value V*(r,X) equals / Xve ~ dF(v).
v>r
We assume that X varies with r so that for some constant c (indepen-
dent of X and r) , V*(r,X) - P*(r,X) = cX . As before, the first order
condition for the r that maximizes R*(r,X) is l-F(r) = rf(r).
For bidders' values distributed uniformly on the unit interval,
R*(r,X) - (1 -.1) + eX(r_i) (i-2r + £), V*(r,X) =
(1 - t-) + (r- - r)e , and the expected profit per bidder
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(R*(r,\) - V*(r,X))/X - ~[1 - ( 1-X ( r-1 )e X t_1 ] . Setting this
X
expected profit per bidder equal to a constant and implicitly differ-
entiating the resulting expression gives
o
2[1-(1-X(r-1) +^(r-l) 2 )eX(r
~ 1)
]
dr
=
2
dX
"
X
3(l-r)eX(r
-1)
(note that for algebraic simplicity, we have chosen to view r as vary-
ing with X rather than vice versa). Using the Taylor series expansion
e = l-X(r-l) + — (r-1) + 5 for some strictly positive 5 estab-
lishes that — < for all X and r.
dA
Now, look at how the bid-taker's expected revenue varies with r
and X when r and X are linked by the above expression for — . In par-dA
ticular,
A A
X(r-l)
X
2 (l-r)
7 7
which reduces to —»— [^ r(l-r) • 5(6r-4)] through an appropriate
use of the previous Taylor series expansion and the previous expres-
sion for —. Note that for r less than or equal to two-thirds, the
dA
bid-taker's expected revenue increases as X increases.
As in the previous example, we need only consider screening levels
r of at most one-half. In this range of interest, the bid-taker's
expected revenue increases with X. However, we have also established
that X increases as r decreases. So, the bid-taker's expected revenue
decreases as r increases. Therefore, to maximize his expected revenue,
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the bid-taker should use the trivial screening level r = 0, and as a
result always award the object to the bidder valuing it most highly.
As in the previous example, the reduction in the bid-takers' ex-
pected revenue resulting from any decrease in the expected number of
bidders outweighs any possible benefits that a non-trivial reservation
price might have had if the number of bidders had been fixed. Whereas
certain non-trivial reservation prices still resulted in the maximum
possible number of bidders in the previous example, only a trivial
reservation price results in the maximum possible mean number of bid-
ders in the second example. However, the possibility remains that in
yet another example the number of bidders will vary so slowly (but
still continuously) in the screening level that the maximum possible
expected revenue for the bid-taker results from a non-trivial reserva-
tion price and a corresponding less than maximum possible number of
bidders; the examples of this paper only show that trivial reservation
prices — and the corresponding ex post efficient auctions — maximize
the bid-taker's expected revenue in at least some plausible instances.
Summary
:
The existing theory of auctions and competitive bidding focuses on
models with a fixed number of bidders. This typically results in the
bid-taker's expected utility being maximized by an ex post inefficient
auction — more specifically, by an auction with a non-trivial reser-
vation price or screening level. However, these results appear to
conflict with certain real world practices.
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This paper investigates the possibility that the optimal tty of
non-trivial reservation prices arises from assuming a fixed number of
bidders. In particular, we let the number of bidders vary with the
screening level. For two straightforward examples, any decrease in
the (expected) number of bidders hurts the bid-taker's expected
revenue more than any benefits from a non-trivial reservation price.
For the one example in which the expected number of bidders varies
strictly with the reservation price, the ex post efficient auction —
the auction with a trivial reservation price — maximizes the bid-
taker's expected revenue. This highlights the important, and pos-
sibly subtle, ramifications of assuming a fixed number of bidders, and
suggests a possible explanation for observed real world practices.
-12-
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